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This paper provides a formal model that investigates optimal timing
in banks’ writing off their nonperforming loans. The motivation
comes from the recent episodes of Japanese banks, which have been
slow to clean up their nonperforming loans after the collapse of the
“bubble” economy in the early 1990s. A real options approach is
employed to measure the value of the rationality of the “forbearance
policy.” It is assumed that uncertainty will arise from the following
sources: (1) the reinvestment return from freeing up funds through
write-offs; (2) liquidation losses; (3) the possible implementation of a
subsidy scheme; and (4) the reputational repercussions from not
immediately writing off their nonperforming loans. This paper
attaches particular importance to the uncertainty from the possible
implementation of the subsidy scheme to explore its desirable features.
Also, this paper examines the possible role of monetary policy in
boosting the banks’ incentive to write off.
Key words: Write-off; Nonperforming loans; Dynamic program-
ming; Real options; Reputation; Forbearance policyI. Introduction
The Japanese economy has been in a prolonged recession, with many banks weighed
down by large-scale nonperforming loans. The primary cause has been a sharp fall in
land prices that began in late 1991. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), once Japan’s pri-
mary regulatory agency,
1was slow in reacting to this problem.
2Recently, harsh criticism
has been directed at the MOF’s so-called “forbearance” or “buy-time” policy, which
allowed banks to keep nonperforming loans on their balance sheets in the hope that the
economy and real estate market would recover in the not-too-distant future.
3
As argued by many authors including Cargill (2000), the failure to promptly solve
the nonperforming-loan problem generated a credit crunch. It has contributed to
stagnant or declining real GDP growth for almost a decade and has interfered with
the efforts by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to stimulate the economy. 
Note, however, that purely from the banks’ perspective, the forbearance policy
itself can be a rational choice. This is because under the stochastic circumstances with
potentially large losses associated with write-offs, the option to wait (delay write-offs)
should have some value. Hence, in deciding whether to write off their nonperform-
ing loans immediately the banks should weigh the value of the option to wait against
the (net) value of carrying out the write-off immediately.
Hoshi (2000) pointed out that if banks are not required by the authorities to 
disclose the true magnitude of their nonperforming loans, there is no incentive to
dispose of such loans. Rather, the banks tend to increase their lending to riskier 
projects. The true problem caused by nonperforming loans, he argues, is that banks
lose their incentive to lend to manufacturing corporations (among others) with
prospective projects, which might damage the intermediation function of banks.
4
If the social costs caused by the damage of banks’ financial intermediary function
outweigh the subsidy costs, then it might be justified to use public funds to push self-
help efforts on banks to clean up their nonperforming loans.
5 At last, in March 1998
and 1999, the Japanese government injected public funds into some banks as capital
support.
6 The use of public funds was justified with the judgment that a prompt 
114 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2001
1. In June 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) was established, directly under the prime minister and
independent of the MOF. The functions of monitoring financial markets and supervising financial institutions
were transferred from the MOF to the FSA. In July 2000, the FSA was upgraded to the Financial Services Agency
responsible for wide-ranging matters related to the financial system. The MOF became mainly responsible for 
budgetary and taxation matters.
2. Ito (2000) pointed out that bank analysts at brokerage firms began to discuss a potential nonperforming-loan problem
in 1992–93, but the MOF was reluctant to force banks to disclose the specific amounts of their nonperforming loans.
3. As explained by Ueda (2000), with the exception of a brief period around 1975, postwar Japan had never experi-
enced a decline in land prices. Thus, no time-series analysis of Japanese land prices through the late 1980s would
have given a high probability of a sharp fall in land prices in 1990.
4. Hoshi (2000) also argues that even if the economy is in the state of a liquidity trap, the credit channel works to
ensure the effectiveness of monetary policy.
5. It should be noted, however, that bank regulators may pursue self-interests rather than social welfare. Boot and Thakor
(1993) examine this possibility by introducing uncertainty in regulators’ ability to monitor banks’ asset choices.
6. In March 1998, an initial wave of less than ¥2 trillion in capital injection was provided to 21 banks. The size of
the injection, in the form of subordinated loans and preferred stocks, was almost uniform across the banks, yet
insufficient. In April 1998, the “prompt corrective action (PCA) rule” took effect, requiring the banks with capital
ratios below certain levels to restructure or even cease operations. Also in October 1998, an agreement to appropri-
ate ¥60 trillion of public funds to strengthen the financial system and recapitalize the banks was enacted.
Recapitalization took place in March 1999. See Ito (2000) for further details.resolution of the nonperforming-loan problem benefits the economy as a whole in
the long run.
As pointed out by Corbett and Mitchell (2000), however, one of the most 
puzzling and interesting facts regarding Japan’s recent bank rescue package is that the
government’s offer was not welcomed by the rescued banks. The key to understand-
ing this seemingly puzzling fact lies in the existence of asymmetric information and a
possible reputation problem.
Typically, asymmetric information exists between banks and the public regarding
the true magnitude of nonperforming loans on their balance sheets.
7 More specifi-
cally, “the public” means shareholders, depositors, and other participants in financial
asset markets. This asymmetric information creates an incentive for banks to roll over
their nonperforming loans to disguise their true financial standing. The government,
which is generally in a position to grasp the true standing of the banks’ balance sheets
through bank examinations and monitoring on a regular basis, is able to rescue the
banks by providing capital supports. 
Corbett and Mitchell (2000) further argue that banks may decline rescue offers
due to reputation concerns. This is because accepting such offers may force banks to
write off nonperforming loans, revealing the hidden information to the public. 
More generally, however, a bank’s reputation depends on what market participants
infer from its write-off decision. In fact, on many occasions, stock prices rose for
Japanese banks
8 that announced they would increase write-offs. Such episodes suggest
there could be reputational repercussions from not writing off nonperforming loans.
This paper models reputational concerns as a fear of increasing fund-raising (outside
finance) costs.
9 And based on these episodes, I introduce the fear only in specifying
the value of the option to wait (delay write-offs), not in specifying the value of 
immediate write-offs.
Motivated by the discussion above, this paper attempts to evaluate (1) optimal
timing in banks’ write-off decisions;
10 and (2) how much compensation or subsidiza-
tion is needed for banks to carry out write-offs as self-help efforts. This paper uses the
so-called real options approach to measure the value of the option to wait. More
specifically, the paper treats banks’ optimal write-off decisions as continuous-time
problems within an infinite horizon.
11
This paper recognizes that the capital injections from the Japanese government in
1998 and 1999 were not literally a subsidy for write-offs. Nevertheless, it is of some
benefit to regulatory authorities to conduct this kind of theoretical experiment insofar
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7. In fact, attempts to identify the scale of the problem have been hampered by lack of disclosure and frequent
changes in the definition of “nonperforming loans.”
8. For example, recall a surge in the stock prices of Sanwa, Tokai, and Asahi banks after they released news of 
large-scale write-offs for fiscal 2000.
9. In this regard, see Boot and Greenbaum (1993) as an example.
10. In reality, the write-off procedure consists of two steps. The first step is known as an indirect write-off. In this
step, the bank only reports an estimated loss, but does not actually liquidate collateral. The second step is a direct
write-off, which makes the bank liquidate collateral and the actual amount of the associated loss is fixed. This
paper’s approach skips the first step of indirect write-offs for simplicity. 
11. A simpler class of models with only two or three discrete decision points might suffice for our qualitative analysis
needs. It should be noted, however, that such a class of models is based on the unrealistic assumption that there is
no uncertainty after two or three units of time. In most markets, future returns are always uncertain, and the
degree of uncertainty increases with the time horizon.as they believe that cleaning up the nonperforming-loan problem is a prerequisite to
stabilizing the financial system as a whole.
The sources of uncertainty in this paper are as follows (Figure 1): 
(1)  The reinvestment return from freeing up funds
12 (collected by liquidating 
collateral): the banks can lend (invest) the funds to prospective projects (in
financial assets).
(2) The loss caused by carrying out write-offs: this is closely linked to land prices,
since real estate collateral has been extensively used when bank loans were 
contracted.
(3) The future implementation of a government subsidy scheme.
(4) The reputational repercussions from not writing off immediately, which takes
the form of an upward jump in fund-raising costs.
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Figure 1  Sources of Uncertainty Influencing Bank Decisions
Another (secondary) aim of this paper is to provide a solid microeconomic foun-
dation to the question of why loans to manufacturing corporations have stagnated in
Japan. As explained by Hoshi (2001), during the “bubble” period, banks eagerly
shifted into collateralized lending. For them, lending to real estate and construction
corporations was particularly promising, because they owned real estate collateral.
Thus, when land prices collapsed in the early 1990s, a non-negligible portion of the
loans to such industries became nonperforming.
Figure 2 shows that bank loans to real estate and construction industries relative
to the size of real economic activity have remained almost unchanged even after the
bursting of the “bubble” economy, while loans to the manufacturing industry have















marketdeclined significantly. At the same time, Figure 3 shows that until recently prof-
itability measured by the ratio of current profits to sales had been markedly lower in
the real estate industry than in other industries. These facts, viewed in conjunction,
imply that Japanese banks have rolled over nonperforming loans to the real estate
industry and thus have not had any incentive to explore prospective projects in the
manufacturing industry.
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Figure 3  Ratio of Current Profits to Sales
Note: The definition of the domestic banks changed in 1992/I. Thus, I used data after
1992/II. 
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Data CD-ROM.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Corporate Business Statistics.The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical
foundation using the dynamic programming technique. Section III numerically 




The problem that a typical bank faces is whether to exercise the option to write off its
nonperforming loans. Figure 4 illustrates a simplified bank’s balance sheet on the
premise that the bank lends all collected money to good projects.
13 It shows that once
the bank writes off its nonperforming loans, it can lend collected money, denoted 
LB + S – L, to good projects.
14 Here, L denotes the amount of losses associated with
the write-off defined as the difference between the value of nonperforming loans (LB)
and the current value of the collateral. S is the government subsidy. At the same time,
net worth changes from N to N +S –L. 
There are informational asymmetries regarding the true magnitude of non-
performing loans between bank managers and the public including its shareholders.
15
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13. Alternatively, the bank can reinvest collected money in financial assets markets.
14. If one assumes that the bank lends collected money to other projects, then the lossLshould include monitoring costs.
15. Some recent studies in corporate governance suggest that bank managers in Japan probably do not act to 
maximize banks’ share prices. Instead, they engage in activities to entrench themselves. Particularly, Claessens,
Figure 4  A Simplified Balance Sheet











Loans (LG + LB + S – L)
Good loans
(LG + LB + S – L)
Other assets (OA)
Funds (FU)
Net worth (N + S – L)
[2] After Write-Off
Notes: 1. S: Government subsidy, L: Liquidation losses.
2. The figures are based on the assumption that collected money is lent to 
good projects.The bank’s incentive to write off lies in the fact that the bank can lend money 
collected from liquidating collateral to other borrowers with prospective projects 
(or reinvest it in the financial markets). The return from the lending (reinvestment)
after netting out a possible rise in fund-raising cost from not writing off immediately
is denoted R.
This paper assumes that the reinvestment return itself follows the standard 
geometric Brownian motion. However, due to possible reputation problems when the
bank delays the write-off, there is a possibility that the net reinvestment return will
fall as a result of rising fund-raising costs in the future. Hence, this paper assumes
that there is a probability, denoted λ , that the reinvestment return net of fund-raising
costs exhibits a downward jump. 
Also, the bank suffers losses denoted L in carrying out write-offs, particularly due
to a fall in the value of collateral. It should be noted, however, that L itself moves 
stochastically because it mainly reflects land prices.
16 L also follows the standard 
geometric Brownian motion. 
The stochastic processes of the reinvestment return and the write-off losses can be
summarized as
dR = α RRdt + σ RRdzR – Rdq, (1)
and  dL = α LLdt + σ LLdzL, (2)
where α R(α L) denotes the expected growth rate of R(L), σ R(σ L) the standard devia-
tion parameter of R(L), dzR(dzL) the increment of a Wiener process of R(L), and 
dq the increment of a Poisson (jump) process with the probability λ dt. The paper
assumes E[(dzR)(dq)] = 0, that is, dzR and dq are independent of each other. Also, 
it is assumed E[(dzR)
2] = E[(dzL)
2] = dt and  E[(dzR)(dzL)] = ρ dt, implying that 
the correlation ρ between R and L is considered in the following analysis. Lastly,
equation (1) states that when a jump occurs, R falls by the fixed ratio φ (0 ≤ φ ≤ 1).
For computational facility, I assume φ = 1 throughout the paper.
Further, the bank faces another source of uncertainty from the future implemen-
tation of the government’s rescue scheme under which the government subsidizes the
bank’s write-off. The paper’s strategy is to express the possible policy implementation
by a Poisson jump.
17 Also, for simplicity, the subsidy amount is proportional to the
loss from the write-off.
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Djankov, and Lang (2000), and Morck and Nakamura (1999) documented that Japanese banks engage in 
substantial cross-shareholdings with other companies as an explicit defense against competitive changes in corpo-
rate control. Through crossholdings, companies can acquire control rights in banks without getting cash flow
rights. Such controlling shareholders could have an incentive to encourage bank management to do things that
maximize their own wealth, such as continue to finance their company’s unprofitable operations, which does not
maximize the bank’s stock price.
16. The majority of nonperforming loans are in the real estate and construction industries.
17. This strategy basically follows Hassett and Metcalf (1999). They examine the case where there is one underlying
stochastic variable and a possible Poisson jump-type policy intervention, and analyze the impact of uncertain tax
policy on investment decisions. The model in this paper augments their model by using two underlying stochastic
variables, one entailing a possible downward jump risk, as well as a Poisson jump-type policy intervention.When the subsidy scheme is not in effect, the probability that the government
will implement it in the next short period dt is denoted λ 1dt. In such cases, the
amount of the subsidy is θ L. On the other hand, when the scheme is in effect, 
the probability that it will be removed in the next short period dt is λ 0dt. In sum, the
subsidy process is given by the following equation of motion: 


θ with probability λ 1dt
dθ =  { 0 with probability 1 – λ 1dt . (3)
 –θ with probability  λ 0dt
 { 0 with probability 1 – λ 0dt
In what follows, first I will examine the case without the possible implementation of
the subsidy scheme, and then consider the government subsidy.
B. The Case without the Subsidy Scheme
1. Basic setup
First, the value of (immediate) write-offs is given by considering only the part of the
standard geometric Brownian motion of equation (1) such that
18
RR V(R) = E[∫
∞
0R(t)e
–µ Rtdt] = ∫
∞
0Re
–(µ R–α R)tdt = ——— — = —, (4)
µ R – α R δ R
where the relationship µ R ≡ α R + δ R =r +υρ (R, M)σ R is assumed to hold
19 as in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994).
20 Here, µ R denotes the risk-adjusted discount rate, δ R the rate 
of return shortfall in R (hereafter, shortfall rate), r the risk-free interest rate, υ the
market price of risk, and ρ (R, M) the coefficient of correlation between R and 
the market return M. For the value of write-off V(R) to be bounded, the condition
δ R > 0 must hold.
21 Otherwise, the bank would never carry out write-offs irrespective
of uncertainty and sunk costs. 
Second, let F(R, L) denote the value of keeping the option to write off alive in
the future (hereafter, the value of waiting). The Bellman equation can be written as
22
µ F(R,L)dt = E[dF(R,L)]. (5)
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18. Notice that once write-offs are carried out, further uncertainty associated with losses is irrelevant, hence the value
of write-offs depends only on the return from reinvesting the collected money.
19. The relationship µ R = r + υρ (R, M)σ R is derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). To get this 
relationship, one needs the stochastic fluctuations in R to be spanned by financial markets. Also, implicitly, 
I assume that the jump risk is non-systematic, that is, uncorrelated with the market portfolio.
20. See chapter 4 for details.
21. In understanding the role of δ R, it is helpful to draw upon the analogy with a financial call option in which R
corresponds to the price of a share of common stock, and δ R the dividend rate. Thus, the total expected rate on
the stock is written as µ R = α R + δ R. In such a case, if the dividend rate δ R were zero, the call option would always
be held to maturity, and never exercised since the opportunity cost to keep the option alive is zero. 
22. In what follows, for simplicity, I drop the subscript R for µ R.Expanding dF(R, L) in equation (5) by Ito’s Lemma for the combined geometric
Brownian motion and Poisson jump
23 yields
1 µ F(R,L)=  —(σ
2
RR
2FRR + 2ρσ Rσ LRLFRL +σ
2
LL
2FLL) +α RRFR 2
+α LLFL + λ {F(0, L) – F(R,L)}, (6)
where FR ≡ ∂ F/∂ R, FL ≡ ∂ F/∂ L, FRR ≡ ∂
2F/∂ R
2, FLL ≡ ∂
2F/∂ L
2, and FRL ≡ ∂
2F/∂ R∂ L.
Now, boundary conditions can be written as
R ˆ
F(R ˆ,L ˆ) =V(R ˆ) – L ˆ = — – L ˆ, (7)
δ R
1 FR(R ˆ,L ˆ) =V'(R ˆ) = —, (8)
δ R
and FL(R ˆ,L ˆ) =–1, (9)
where condition (7) is the value-matching condition and conditions (8) and (9) are
both the smooth-pasting conditions. Also, R ˆ and L ˆ indicate the threshold values of 
R and L at which the bank becomes indifferent between writing off and waiting.
2. The free boundary problem
The problem in the last section is called a “free boundary” problem.
24 In such a case,
it is very difficult to obtain clear-cut analytical solutions. Nevertheless, the property
of homogeneity of the net value function V(R) – L
25 allows one to reduce the 
problem to one dimension.
Thus, the optimal decision only depends on the ratio rR ≡ R/L, which implies that
the value of waiting F(R, L) should also be homogeneous of degree one with respect
to R and L. That is, the following set of relationships holds:
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23. In general, if the stochastic process is
dx =a(x, t)dt +b(x, t)dz + g(x, t)dq,
then the expected value of the change in any function H(x, t) can be given by
∂ H ∂ H 1             ∂
2H E[dH ] = [— — + a(x, t)— — + —b
2(x, t)— —]dt +Eφ {λ [H(x + g(x, t)φ , t) –H(x, t)]}dt.
∂ t ∂ x 2             ∂ x
2
For more details, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chapter 3, p. 86.
24. For more details, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chapter 6, p. 209.
25. Note that if the current values of bothR and L are doubled, it will double the value V and the costL simultaneously.R F(R,L) = Lf (—) ≡ Lf (rR), (10)
L
FR(R,L) = f '(rR), (11)
FL(R,L) = f (rR) – rR f '(rR), (12)
FRR(R, L) = f ''(rR)/L, (13)
FRL(R,L) = – rR f ''(rR)/L, (14)
and FLL(R,L) = (rR)
2f ''(rR)/L. (15)
Using equations (10)–(15), equation (6) can be rewritten as
1 —(σ
2





+ (α R – α L)rRf '(rR) + (α L – µ – λ )f (rR) = 0. (16)
The solution to the second-order differential equation (16) takes the form
f (rR) = A(rR)
β , (17)
where A and β are coefficients to be determined.
Direct substitution of solution (17) into equation (16) yields
1 —(σ
2
R –2ρσ Rσ L +σ
2
L)β (β –1 )+  ( α R –α L)β +( α L – µ –λ ) = 0. (18)
2
Thus, β can be solved analytically as
1             (α R –α L) β = — – ——————— —
2     (σ
2




(α R –α L)            1           2(µ + λ – α L)  +    [
——————— — – —]
2
+ ——————— —. (19)
√ (σ
2
R –2 ρσ Rσ L +σ
2
L)     2       (σ
2
R –2 ρσ Rσ L +σ
2
L)
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r ˆ R f (r ˆ R) =A(r ˆ R)
β = — – 1, (20)
δ R
1 f '(r ˆ R) =Aβ (r ˆ R)
β –1 = —, (21)
δ R
and f (r ˆ R) –r ˆ Rf '(r ˆ R) =A(r ˆ R)
β (1 – β ) = –1, (22)
where r ˆ R denotes the threshold ratio. Note that of these three boundary conditions,
no single one is independent of the other two. 
Equations (20) and (21) jointly imply
β r ˆ R = —— —δ R. (23)
β –1
Figure 5 illustrates a free boundary r ˆ R of the ratio of reinvestment return to write-
off losses. In regime I, the current value of rR is below the threshold value r ˆ R so that
the bank prefers waiting to writing off now. Also, Figure 6 depicts boundary condi-
tions for f (rR) and the determination of r ˆ R. At the threshold ratio r ˆ R, the value from
write-offs meets the value of waiting tangentially.
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Figure 5  Free Boundary of r ˆ
R without a Subsidy Scheme
Reinvestment return net 







ˆ rR3. The relationship between r ˆ R and the required reinvestment rate of return rr ––
Note that the threshold ratio r ˆ R is in terms of write-off losses, not in terms of the
amount of reinvested funds. Thus, in evaluating r ˆ R in line with a realistic economic
situation, it is helpful to translate r ˆ R into a usual rate of return form. 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between r ˆ R and the required reinvestment rate of
return rr – –. The following relationship is evident:
 1 – –   L

if L ≤ —LB, thenrr = ——— r ˆ R ≤ r ˆ R
. (24) 2                      LB –L
 otherwise,           rr – – >r ˆ R
For example, when a loss amounts to a quarter of the nonperforming loan, rr – – is equal
to 1/3r ˆ R. And when the loss is three-quarters, rr – – is 3r ˆ R.
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Figure 6  Boundary Conditions for f (rR) and the Determination of r ˆ
R
Write-off now
Regime I Regime II






(i): f(rR) = A(rR)
β (equation [17])
rR (ii): f(rR) = — – 1 (right-hand side of equation [20])
δ RC. The Case with the Possible Implementation of a Subsidy Scheme
Now let me consider the case in which the bank expects the implementation of a
subsidy by the government with some probability. To begin, let F0(R, L) = Lf0(rR)
denote the value of waiting in the absence of a subsidy scheme and let F1(R, L) =
Lf1(rR) denote the value in the presence of the scheme, respectively. In this setting,
one can divide the decision rule of the bank into the following three regimes, imply-
ing the existence of two threshold ratios. See Figures 8 and 9 for the illustration of
the three regimes.
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Figure 7  The Relationship between r ˆ
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rR ≡  —First, over the interval of low values of rR, denoted (0, rR –– ), the bank will not write
off irrespective of whether or not the subsidy scheme is in effect. 
Second, over the interval denoted (rR –– , rR –– ), the bank will write off if the subsidy
scheme is in effect. Otherwise, the bank will prefer to wait in the hope that the sub-
sidy scheme will be implemented and/or land prices will recover so that liquidation
losses will decrease in the future.
Third, over the interval denoted (rR –– , ∞ ), the bank is willing to write off irrespec-
tive of a subsidy scheme. Referring to Hassett and Metcalf (1999), let me find the
two thresholds, rR –– and rR –– below. 
1. Regime 1 (0, rR –– ): No write-off irrespective of the subsidy scheme
Over the interval (0, rR –– ), the bank prefers to wait irrespective of a subsidy scheme, and




R –2 ρσ Rσ L +σ
2
L)(rR)
2f 0 '' (rR) + (α R –α L)rR f 0 '(rR)
2
+ (α L – µ – λ )f 0(rR) + λ 1[f 1(rR) – f 0(rR)] = 0. (25)
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Figure 9  Free Boundaries of the Ratio of the Reinvestment Return to Write Off Losses
Reinvestment return net of 







26. The derivation of equation (25) is made in the following way. When the subsidy is not in effect, over the next
short interval of time dt, the probability that the subsidy will be implemented is λ 1dt. In this case, the value of
the option to write off is F1(R +dR, L +dL). Otherwise, it is F0(R +dR, L +dL). Hence, 
F0(R +dR, L +dL) = e
–µ dt{(λ 1dt)E[F1(R +dR, L +dL)] + (1 – λ 1dt)E[F0(R +dR, L +dL)]}
follows. Expanding the preceding equation by Ito’s Lemma and using the assumption of homogeneity yields
equation (25). Equation (26) can be derived in the same way.1 —(σ
2
R –2 ρσ Rσ L +σ
2
L)(rR)
2f 1 '' (rR) + (α R –α L)rR f 1 '(rR)
2
+ (α L – µ – λ )f 1(rR) + λ 0[f 0(rR) – f 1(rR)] = 0. (26)
Since both value functions f 0(rR) and f 1(rR) appear in each equation, one needs to
consider the two linear combinations that can be solved easily. For example, consider
new value functions fa(rR) and fb(rR) such that
f 0(rR)     f 1(rR) fa(rR) = —— — + —— —, (27)
λ 1 λ 0
and  fb(rR) = f 1(rR) – f 0(rR). (28)
Then, equations (25) and (26) can be rewritten in terms of fa(rR) and fb(rR) as
1 —(σ
2
R –2 ρσ Rσ L +σ
2
L)(rR)
2f a'' (rR) + (α R –α L)rR f a '(rR)
2
+ (α L – µ – λ )fa(rR) = 0, (29)
1 —(σ
2
R –2 ρσ Rσ L +σ
2
L)(rR)
2fb''(rR) + (α R – α L)rR f b'(rR)
2
+ (α L – µ – λ – λ 0 – λ 1)fb(rR) = 0. (30)
The solutions to the second-order differential equations take the forms
27




where B, C, β 1, and β 2 are coefficients to be determined. Here note that β 1 is the 
positive root of 
1 —(σ R
2 – 2ρσ Rσ L +σ L
2)β (β –1)+ (α R – α L)β + (α L – µ – λ )= 0, (33)
2
and β 2 is the positive root of 
1 —(σ R
2 – 2ρσ Rσ L +σ L
2)β (β –1)+ (α R – α L)β
2
+ (α L – µ – λ – λ 0 – λ 1)= 0. (34)
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27. Note that since the interval of rR extends to zero, only the positive root of a quadratic equation matters.With this background information, the solutions for f 0(rR) and f 1(rR) over the interval
(0, rR –) are given by
λ 0λ 1B(rR)
β 1 – λ 1C(rR)
β 2
f 0(rR) = ————————––, (35)
λ 0 + λ 1
λ 0λ 1B(rR)
β 1 + λ 0C(rR)
β 2
and f 1(rR) = ————————––. (36)
λ 0 + λ 1
2. Regime 2 (rR –– , rR –– ): Write-off now if the subsidy scheme is in effect
Over the interval (rR –, rR –), the bank will write off nonperforming loans immediately if
the subsidy scheme is in effect. Otherwise, the bank will not. Thus, f 1(rR) is given by
28
rR f 1(rR) = — – (1 – θ ), (37)
δ R
where θ denotes the portion of the subsidy
29 in the loss.
On the other hand, f 0(rR) is found in the same way as equations (25) and (26).
1 —(σ R
2 – 2ρσ Rσ L +σ L
2)(rR)
2f 0''(rR)+ (α R – α L)rR f 0 '(rR)
2
+ (α L – µ – λ )f 0(rR)+ λ 1[f 1(rR) – f 0(rR)]= 0. (38)
Using equation (37), equation (38) can be rewritten as
1 —(σ R
2 – 2ρσ Rσ L +σ L
2)(rR)
2f 0''(rR)+ (α R – α L)rR f 0 '(rR)
2
λ 1 + (α L – µ – λ – λ 1)f 0(rR)+ —rR – λ 1(1 – θ ) = 0. (39)
δ R
The general solution takes the form
λ 1rR λ 1(1 – θ ) f 0(rR)=D(rR)
β 3 +E(rR)
β 4 + ———————– – – —————— –, (40)
δ R(µ +λ + λ 1– α R)    µ + λ + λ 1– α L
where D and E are constants to be determined and β 3 and β 4 are the positive and
negative roots of the quadratic function of the form:
1 —(σ R
2 –2ρσ Rσ L+σ L
2)β (β –1 )+(α R –α L)β +(α L – µ – λ – λ 1) = 0. (41)
2
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28. Notice that equation (37) is equivalent to F1(R, L) =R/δ R – (1 – θ )L.
29. See equation (3) for its definition.3. Regime 3 (rR –, ∞ ): Write-off now irrespective of the subsidy scheme
Over the interval (rR –, ∞ ), the bank always writes off nonperforming loans, irrespective
of the subsidy scheme. Thus, the following relationships hold:
rR f 0(rR)= — – 1, (42)
δ R
rR and f 1(rR)= — – (1 – θ ). (43)
δ R
4. Boundary conditions linking each regime
30
Now that each solution form has been found, the next step is to find boundary 
conditions, which relate to each of the above-derived value functions.
First, at the threshold rR –, the bank will write off if the subsidy scheme is in effect.
Thus, for the expressions for f 1(rR), equations (36) and (37) yield
λ 0λ 1B(rR –)
β 1 + λ 0C(rR –)
β 2 rR – ————————— = — – (1 – θ ), (44)
λ 0 + λ 1 δ R
λ 0λ 1Bβ 1(rR –)
β 1–1 + λ 0Cβ 2(rR –)
β 2–1 1  and ———————————– – = —, (45)
λ 0 + λ 1 δ R
where equations (44) and (45) denote value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions.
Second, for f 0(rR), although this is not actually associated with a decision threshold,
the function has to be continuously differentiable across it. Thus, equations (35) and
(40) yield
λ 0λ 1B(rR –)
β 1 – λ 1C(rR –)
β 2
————————— =D(rR –)
β 3 + E(rR –)
β 4
λ 0 + λ 1
λ 1rR – λ 1(1 – θ ) + ———————— –——————–, (46)
δ R(µ + λ + λ 1 – α R)     µ + λ + λ 1 – α L
λ 0λ 1Bβ 1(rR –)
β 1–1 – λ 1Cβ 2(rR –)
β 2–1
———————————– – =Dβ 3(rR –)
β 3–1
λ 0 + λ 1
λ 1 +Eβ 4(rR –)
β 4–1 + ————————. (47)
δ R(µ + λ + λ 1– α R)
Third, at the threshold rR –, the expressions for f 0(rR) should satisfy the value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions. Hence, equations (40) and (42) yield
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30. Notice that the case without the government subsidy corresponds to a special case where λ 0=λ 1= θ = 0 in this model.λ 1rR – λ 1(1 – θ )         rR –
D(rR –)
β 3 +E(rR –)
β 4 + ———————– – —————— – = — – 1, (48)
δ R(µ + λ + λ 1– α R)    µ + λ + λ 1– α L δ R
λ 1 1 and Dβ 3(rR –)
β 3–1+Eβ 4(rR –)
β 4–1+ ———————– = —, (49)
δ R(µ + λ + λ 1– α R)    δ R




1      FF 1  
2 2(µ +λ –α L) β 1 = — – — + 
√ (— – —) + —————–
 2     GG 2                G
 ––——————————————
 1      FF 1  
2 2(µ + λ + λ 0+ λ 1 – α L)

β 2 = — – — + 
√ (— – —) + —————————–

2     GG 2                      G

––———————————— – , (50)
1      FF 1  
2 2(µ + λ + λ 1 – α L)
 β 3 = — – — + 
√ (— – —) + ———————–
2     GG 2                    G  ––———————————— –  1      FF 1  
2 2(µ + λ + λ 1 – α L)  β 4 = — – — – 
√ (— – —) + ———————–
 2     GG 2                    G
F = α R – α L, and G = σ R
2 –2 ρσ Rσ L +σ L
2. (51)
It is evident that the relation β 4 < 0 < 1 < β 1 ≤ β 3 ≤ β 2 holds. In sum, there are six
equations to determine two thresholds rR – and rR – and four constants B,C,D, and E.
31
Figure 10 [1] and [2] illustrates these boundary conditions and the determination
of the threshold ratios rR – and rR –. They show that at the threshold ratio rR –, two expres-
sions of f 0(rR) representing regimes 1 and 2 (equations [35] and [40]) meet tangen-
tially, and at the same time, two expressions of f 1(rR) representing regimes 1 and 2
(equations [36] and [37]) meet in the same manner. And at the threshold ratio rR –,
only the two expressions of f 0(rR) representing regimes 2 and 3 (equations [40] and
[42]) meet tangentially to ensure continuity.
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31. This paper uses a Levenberg-Marquardt method included in Mathcad 2000 Professional as a solving algorithm. 
It is a variant of the usual quasi-Newton method. To make the Levenberg-Marquardt method more efficient,
Mathcad modifies the following points: 
(1) The first time the solver stops at a point that is not a solution, Mathcad adds a small random amount to
all the variables and makes another attempt. This helps avoid dead ends in local minima and other points
from which there is no preferred direction. 
(2) If inequality constraints are included as in the case of mine, Mathcad first solves the subsystem consisting
of only the inequalities before adding the equality constraints and attempting a full solution.131
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λ 0λ 1B(rR)β 1 – λ 1C(rR)β 2
(iii): f0(rR) = ————————— — (equation [35])
λ 0 + λ 1
(iv): f0(rR) = D(rR)β 3 + E(rR)β 4
λ 1rR λ 1(1 – θ )
+ ———————— — – —————— — (equation [40])
δ R(µ + λ + λ 1 – α R)     µ + λ + λ 1 – α L
rR (v):  f0(rR) = — – 1 (equation [42])
δ R
λ 0λ 1B(rR)β 1 + λ 0C(rR)β 2
(vi): f1(rR) = ————————— — (equation [36])
λ 0 + λ 1
rR (vii): f1(rR) = — – (1 – θ ) (equations [37] and [43])
δ R
[2] Boundary Conditions for f1(rR)
[1] Boundary Conditions for f0(rR)III. Numerical Analysis
This section reports the results of numerical analysis based on the theoretical model
described in the last section. The baseline parameters are set in annual terms as follows:
α R = 0.02, α L = –0.02, δ R = 0.02, σ R = 0.2, σ L = 0.3, ρ = 0.0, and λ = 0.0.
Here, the negative value of the expected growth rate of the write-off loss α L reflects
the banks’ optimistic expectations about future conditions in the real estate market,
32
and the relative magnitude between σ R and σ L reflects larger volatility in the real
estate market. As for the correlation term ρ and the probability of a jump in fund-
raising costs λ , it is difficult to find “plausible” values. Thus, this paper tentatively 
set both values at zero in the baseline case and changed them over a wide range. 
Table 1 summarizes the qualitative results of numerical analysis, and I will examine
the resulting details.
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32. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that this expectation was not realized, but as Cargill, Hutchison, and 
Ito (1997) argue, the MOF also had such an optimistic view of the real estate market, not to mention the
Japanese banks.





rR,  rR )
Underlying parameters
Volatility σ R ++     +
σ L ++     +
Correlation ρ ––     –
Expected growth α R Case (i) + +    +
Case (ii) ––     –
α L ––     –
Shortfall rate δ R ++     +
Reputation problem
Risk premium λ ––     –
Policy uncertainty
Probability about the  λ 1 .... +    +
subsidy scheme λ 0 .... –    –
Portion of the subsidy θ .... – ±
Notes: 1. + indicates that the endogenous variable rises when the exogenous variable rises. 
– indicates vice versa. ± denotes that the direction depends on other parameter values.
....indicates that ˆ rR does not depend on these parameters.
2. Case (i) denotes the case in which δ R is held constant, while letting µ adjust freely. 
Case (ii) denotes the case in which µ is held constant, while letting δ R adjust freely.
A. The Case without a Subsidy Scheme
Figure 11 [1] to [4] shows the dependence of the threshold ratio r ˆ R = R ˆ/L ˆ on various
parameter values. Before examining the detailed numerical results, note that a very large
rate of return is required for the banks to immediately write off their nonperforming133
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Figure 11  Threshold Ratio r ˆ
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Note: α R = 0.02, α L = –0.02, σ L = 0.3, ρ = 0.0, and λ = 0.0.loans under various settings. For example, a value of r ˆ R = 0.05 means more than a 
5 percent annual reinvestment rate of return if the loss is more than half of the 
nonperforming loans. Judging from the low current investment rate of return in 
the Japanese financial markets,
33 obtaining such a high return seems almost impossible
in reality.
Now, let me check how the basic model works. First, Figure 11 [1] shows that the
more uncertain the bank’s economic environment becomes (larger values of σ R and
σ L), the larger the threshold ratio r ˆ R becomes.
34 This result holds for uncertainty in
both underlying stochastic variables, reinvestment return R and the loss from the
write-off L.
Second, consider the effect of a rise in the coefficient of correlation ρ between R
and L. As shown in Figure 11 [2], a greater ρ results in a lower r ˆ R. This result directly
follows the fact that the variance of rR under the assumption of homogeneity of
degree one can be expressed as σ R
2 – 2ρσ Rσ L + σ L
2 so that a larger value of ρ implies a
smaller volatility, which increases the incentive to immediately write off.
Third, look at the effects of a change in expected growth parameters, α R and α L. 
It turns out that the effect of α L is more straightforward than that of α R. As shown in
Figure 11 [2] and [3], the larger (smaller) the expected losses from future write-offs, the
greater the (weaker) banks’ incentive to immediately write off. This result is closely
related to the familiar story about the forbearance policy taken by the government
regarding write-offs of nonperforming loans in the Japanese banking industry.
For the effect of α R, one should be careful about the results obtained under alter-
native assumptions regarding which parameter is adjustable, µ or  δ R. Under the
assumption that µ changes exactly as much as α R
35 (Figure 11 [3]A), the threshold ratio
r ˆ R rises as a result of a rise in α R. Intuitively, the underlying reason is that the present
value of write-off losses carried out in the future is discounted by the risk-adjusted 
discount rate µ , while the present value of the reinvestment of collected money is 
discounted by δ R,
36 which is assumed to be constant. Hence, an increase in α R (thus µ )
reduces the present value of future write-off losses, but does not reduce its payoff.
On the other hand, under the alternative assumption that µ is constant while
adjusting δ R in response to changes in α R (Figure 11 [3]B), the direction of the effect
of rises in α R (thus falls in δ R) does the opposite of the preceding case. The reason can
be found using the preceding logic; while the present value of the future write-off
losses is invariant, reinvestment payoff will rise.
Fourth, how does an increase in the downward jump risk of the reinvestment
return influence the optimal decision-making of rational banks? Generally, the effects
of a positive value of the probability of the downward jump risk λ can be stated as
follows. First, it reduces the expected rate of capital gain on R, which decreases the
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33. For example, in December 1999 the average contracted interest rate on new loans and discounts was 1.82 percent
and the yield of 10-year government bonds, which occupy a non-negligible part of Japanese banks’ working assets,
was 1.84 percent (both in annual terms).
34. As pointed out by Dixit and Pindyck ([1994]; see chapter 5, p. 153), an interesting point here is that write-off
(investment) decisions are highly sensitive to volatility in write-off (project) values, irrespective of investors’ or
managers’ risk preferences. Thus, if one assumes that a bank is risk-neutral, the same result will follow.
35. Recall the relationship µ ≡ α R + δ R.
36. See equation (4).value of waiting. On the other hand, it increases the variance of changes in R and
thus raises the value of waiting. It turns out that under normal circumstances, the
former effect is more dominant. Figure 11 [4] lays out the result that the former
effect is much larger than the latter, thereby reducing the threshold ratio r ˆ R. Further,
notice that a small increase in λ leads to a substantial decline in r ˆ R, prompting the
bank to immediately write off.
Fifth, look at the effect of an increase in the shortfall rate δ R on the threshold ratio
of r ˆ R. Figure 11 [5] shows the result under the assumption that the risk-adjusted 
discount rate µ moves in response to a change in δ R. In the present model, although
the effect via µ has an influence through β (equation [19]), the direct effect of δ R has
a greater influence as shown by equation (23). Thus, the net effect increases the
threshold ratior ˆ R.
B. The Case with the Possible Implementation of a Subsidy Scheme
Now let me examine the case with the possible implementation of a subsidy scheme by
the government.
37 As mentioned earlier, this case generalizes the last case in that λ 0, λ 1,
and θ take on positive values. In fact, the threshold ratios rR – and rR – should converge to
r ˆ R as the values of λ 0, λ 1, and θ approach zero. Thus, in this subsection, I focus on the
numerical results when one changes the values of λ 0, λ 1, and θ .
First, consider the situation where the scheme is not currently in effect. Figure 12 [1]
shows that as the probability of the implementation λ 1 increases, the threshold ratio
rR – increases. This result is very intuitive. The prospect of reduced write-off losses
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37. The results of the effects of changes in parameters other than those of policy uncertain on rR – and rR – are the same
as in the case without the possible subsidy. 
Figure 12  Threshold Ratios r – –
R and r – –
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[1] Dependence of rR
– – on λ 1 and λ 0inevitably increases the value of waiting. One of the most impressive aspects to 
note here is the magnitude of the effect of an increase in λ 1. When the bank is 
100 percent certain
38 of the implementation of the subsidy scheme
39 in the next period,
the threshold ratio rR – approximately doubles from when λ 1 = 0.1. Also, notice that
even when the implementation of the scheme is being discussed and is still uncertain,
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38. Note that the 100 percent probability of a subsidy enactment is just in the bank’s expectation and does not imply
that the policy will really be enacted within the next year.
39. One can rephrase this condition as saying “if the regulatory authorities can make a fully credible commitment to
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Note: α R = 0.02, α L = –0.02, δ R = 0.02, σ R = 0.2, σ L = 0.3, ρ = 0.0, λ = 0.1, λ 0 = 0.3, 
and λ 1 = 0.3.the effect is to strongly discourage the incentive to immediately write off. Another
important point is that even in the absence of the scheme, the threshold ratio rR – is
influenced by the probability λ 0of the scheme’s removal.
Next consider the situation in the presence of the scheme. Figure 12 [2] shows that
the threshold ratio rR – decreases as λ 0 increases. This result is also intuitive because it is
natural that the prospect of losing the scheme should induce the bank to immediately
write off. Further, this figure shows that an increase in λ 1 also increases rR –.
Now let me examine the effect of an increase in the ratio of the subsidy to the 
loss θ . Figure 12 [3] shows the dependence of rR – and rR – on the value of θ . This 
figure shows that both threshold ratios rR – and rR – are inversely related to θ for low 
values of θ . The effect is also much stronger on rR – than on rR –. 
An interesting point is that the threshold ratio rR – in the absence of a scheme is also
influenced by θ . Numerical analysis suggests that there are two competing channels
through which θ can influence rR –. One channel increases the incentive to wait by
lowering the last term of f 0(rR) (equation [40]). The other channel works in the
opposite direction through a fall in D in the same equation. Which force is stronger
depends on the range of the parameter θ . Generally, as shown in Figure 12 [3], when
θ is small, the latter effect is greater than the former effect, but at some value of θ the
net effect reverses the direction, and a rise in θ raises the threshold ratio rR –.
IV. Some Policy Discussions
A. Implications for the Implementation of a Subsidy Scheme 
Uncertainty about the implementation of a subsidy scheme will give banks an 
incentive to delay write-offs. In other words, if the government aims to accelerate
banks’ self-help efforts toward reducing their nonperforming loans, sound policy
should have properties of low λ 1, high λ 0, and large θ . The government should
immediately implement the subsidy scheme, giving banks a credible threat to 
immediately abolish it and pledging never to restore it, although we have difficulty
imagining such a threat in reality.
B. Possible Implications for Monetary Policy
Until quite recently, the BOJ has controlled short-term interest rates such as the
overnight call rate for purposes of influencing the real economy.
40 The overnight call
rate is considered to be riskless. Under this paper’s assumption of µ ≡ α R + δ R = r +
υρ (R, M )σ R, a rise in the call rate by the BOJ leads to a rise in the risk-adjusted 
discount rate µ of banks either via a rise in α R or δ R, other things being equal. 
The analysis shows that a rise in the risk-adjusted discount rate µ via either α R or
δ R makes banks more hesitant to immediately dispose of their nonperforming loans.
Hence, if the central bank would like to accelerate banks’ efforts to clean up their 
balance sheets, it should lower the interest rate to a point where banks regard it as
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40. In March 2001, the BOJ changed the main operating target for money market operations from the overnight call
rate to the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the BOJ.long-lasting and so revise downward their perceived risk-adjusted discount rate. In
this regard, recent monetary policy conducted by the BOJ is worthy of attention. To
stimulate a depressed economy, the BOJ lowered short-term interest rates, including
the call rate, to almost zero from 1995,
41 which might have some effect in raising the
incentive for the banks to write off.
42
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated how rational banks’ optimal timing of write-offs is 
influenced by uncertainty stemming from various sources. A real options approach
was employed to evaluate the value of the option to delay write-offs, that is, the value
of forbearance policy. 
Numerical analysis shows that, under normal circumstances, a very large rate 
of reinvestment return is required for the banks to immediately write off their 
nonperforming loans. Another important result is that uncertainty about the 
implementation of a subsidy scheme gives banks incentive to wait. This is contrary 
to the government’s intention. If the government aims to encourage banks’ self-help
efforts toward reducing nonperforming loans, it should immediately enact a subsidy
scheme, giving them a legitimate threat to immediately abolish it and pledging 
never to restore it in the future. This kind of policy is theoretically possible, but
seems difficult to implement in reality. 
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41. Monetary easing of this nature can be characterized as a policy to “buy time,” that is, to buy time until the 
structural policy bears fruit. In fact, when it lowered the official discount rate to 0.5 percent in September 1995,
the BOJ Policy Board issued a statement stressing that such monetary easing would only be effective if it were
accompanied by structural policies.
42. However, it is also true that the enlargement of profit margin resulting from the so-called zero interest rate policy
gave banks room to retain their nonperforming loans. This paper pays no attention to the monetary policy effect
on the interaction between the cost structure and the incentive to dispose of nonperforming bank loans. Thus,
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